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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 These consolidated petitions for review concern the 
Atlantic Sunrise Project, an expansion of the natural-gas 
distribution network owned by Intervenor Transcontinental 
Gas Pipe Line Company (Transco). At issue is a decision of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
(PADEP or the Department) granting Atlantic Sunrise a Water 
Quality Certification under Section 401 of the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).  
In addition to their challenge to the merits of PADEP’s 
decision to grant the Water Quality Certification, Petitioners 
raise an important jurisdictional question we left open in 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary of Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (Riverkeeper II), 870 
F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2017): whether our exclusive 
jurisdiction under the judicial review provisions of the Natural 
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d), requires finality and how such a 
requirement would interact with Pennsylvania’s administrative 
scheme.  
For the reasons that follow, we hold that we have 
jurisdiction over the petitions and that Petitioners’ challenges 
fail on the merits. 
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I 
A 
 We begin with a brief overview of the regulatory 
background. The Natural Gas Act prohibits construction or 
operation of a natural gas pipeline without a Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC). 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A). 
And since many other federal laws and regulations apply to 
pipeline projects, FERC often requires a showing of 
compliance with those other mandates as part of its permitting 
process. See id. § 717f(e) (authorizing FERC to grant 
Certificates subject to “reasonable terms and conditions”). 
FERC did so here, preventing Transco from starting 
construction on Atlantic Sunrise until it demonstrates “that it 
has received all applicable authorizations required under 
federal law.” Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co, LLC 
(Transco), 158 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61125, at App. C ¶ 10 (2017).  
One such authorization is a discharge permit under 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
Because obtaining a Section 404 permit is a federal 
requirement and the construction and operation of Atlantic 
Sunrise “may result in a[] discharge into . . . navigable waters,” 
Transco must also comply with Section 401 of the Clean Water 
Act. Id. § 1341(a)(1). Section 401 requires permit applicants to 
obtain “a certification from the State in which the discharge . . . 
will originate . . . that any such discharge will comply with” 
that State’s water-quality standards. Id. Because of these 
statutory requirements, Transco had to obtain a Water Quality 
Certification from PADEP before FERC would approve the 
pipeline project.  
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B 
 In an attempt to satisfy the obligations just described, in 
the spring of 2015 Transco applied both to FERC for a 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity and to 
PADEP for a Water Quality Certification. Shortly thereafter, 
PADEP published notice in the Pennsylvania Bulletin 
(Pennsylvania’s answer to the Federal Register) of its intent to 
grant Transco a Water Quality Certification. After a public 
comment period, the Department certified in April 2016 that 
Atlantic Sunrise would comply with Pennsylvania’s water-
quality standards if it satisfied certain conditions. Three of 
those conditions are relevant here, requiring Transco to obtain 
the following from PADEP: 
1. a permit under the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System, 25 PA. 
CODE §§ 92a.1–.104, covering the 
discharge of water during hydrostatic 
pipeline testing; 
2. a permit under Chapter 102 of PADEP’s 
own regulations, 25 PA. CODE §§ 102.1–
.51, covering erosion and sediment 
disturbance associated with pipeline 
construction; and 
3. a permit under Chapter 105 of the 
Department’s regulations, 25 PA. CODE 
§§ 105.1–.449, covering obstructions of 
and encroachments on Pennsylvania 
waters. 
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 In response to PADEP’s notice, Petitioners immediately 
filed two parallel challenges to the approved Water Quality 
Certification. First, they sought relief directly from this Court 
under the exclusive review provision of the Natural Gas Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1). Second, three of the petitioners also 
appealed PADEP’s decision to the Pennsylvania 
Environmental Hearing Board (EHB or the Board).1 The Board 
has stayed its proceedings pending our jurisdictional ruling, so 
we turn to that issue now. 
II 
 Under the Natural Gas Act, the courts of appeals have 
“original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the 
review” of a state administrative agency’s “action” taken 
“pursuant to Federal law to issue . . . any . . . concurrence” that 
federal law requires for the construction of a natural-gas 
transportation facility. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1) (cross-
referencing 15 U.S.C. § 717f). We have previously held that 
when PADEP issues a Water Quality Certification, it does so 
“pursuant to federal law,” Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y 
Pa. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. (Riverkeeper I), 833 F.3d 360, 370–
72 (3d Cir. 2016), and the parties do not dispute that federal 
law requires the Department to concur before construction on 
Atlantic Sunrise can move forward. 
 Nevertheless, Petitioners contend that we lack 
jurisdiction to review their claims. Relying on the First 
Circuit’s decision in Berkshire Environmental Action Team, 
                                                 
1 See Lancaster Against Pipelines v. Commonwealth, 
No. 2016-075-L (Pa. Envtl. Hrg. Bd.); Nesbitt v. 
Commonwealth, No. 2016-076-L (Pa. Envtl. Hrg. Bd.); Sierra 
Club v. Commonwealth, No. 2016-078-L (Pa. Envtl. Hrg. Bd.). 
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Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, 851 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 
2017), they argue (1) that the Natural Gas Act permits this 
Court to hear suits challenging only a state agency’s final 
action, and (2) that PADEP’s Water Quality Certification is 
non-final until the EHB rules on Petitioners’ administrative 
appeal. We address both issues in turn. 
A 
 Like the petitions here, Berkshire Environmental 
involved the Natural Gas Act, the Clean Water Act, and a 
state’s administrative procedures. In that case, FERC granted a 
pipeline company a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity subject to essentially the same condition imposed 
here—the company would have to demonstrate it had received 
all of its federal permits in order to build its pipeline. Berkshire 
Environmental, 851 F.3d at 107. The company subsequently 
applied for and received a Water Quality Certification from the 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 
(MassDEP) after a notice-and-comment procedure. Id. at 107–
08. Under Massachusetts law, aggrieved parties then had 21 
days to “appeal” that initial decision by demanding a hearing 
before MassDEP. Id. at 108, 112–13. 
 Like Transco here, the pipeline company argued that 
MassDEP had no authority to hear such an appeal in light of 
the First Circuit’s original and exclusive jurisdiction under the 
Natural Gas Act. Id. at 108. And like Petitioners here, the 
challengers in Berkshire Environmental asked for a declaration 
that the Water Quality Certification would become final and 
reviewable by the Court of Appeals only at the conclusion of 
their state administrative appeals. Id. The First Circuit agreed 
with the challengers on the jurisdictional question, holding that 
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the Natural Gas Act permits review of only an agency’s final 
decisions. Id. at 111. 
 Our sister court’s reasoning is straightforward and 
persuasive: Although “[i]n a literal sense, state agencies 
repeatedly take ‘action’ in connection with applications for 
water quality certifications,” Congress did not intend for us to 
“exercise immediate review over [the many] . . . 
preliminary . . . steps that state agencies may take in processing 
an application before they actually act in the more relevant and 
consequential sense of granting or denying it.” Id. at 108. To 
be sure, the Natural Gas Act’s reference to state “action” does 
not expressly restrict our review to an agency’s ultimate 
decisions, but there is a “well-settled ‘strong presumption that 
judicial review will be available only when agency action 
becomes final.’ To say that silence on the subject implies no 
requirement of finality would be to recognize this ‘strong 
presumption’ only when it is of little benefit.” Id. at 109 
(quoting Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983)) 
(citations and alterations omitted). We therefore join the First 
Circuit in holding that the Natural Gas Act provides 
jurisdiction to review only “final agency action of a type that 
is customarily subject to judicial review.” Id. at 111. 
 In resisting that conclusion, PADEP and Transco rely 
almost entirely on Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. LLC v. 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 921 F. Supp. 2d 381 (M.D. 
Pa. 2013), which held that the Natural Gas Act gives this Court 
“an unqualified right of review” over even non-final Water 
Quality Certifications. Id. at 391. We reject that proposition. 
Tennessee Gas failed to acknowledge our longstanding 
presumption that Congress intends judicial review over only 
final administrative action. Instead, it framed the issue as 
whether to graft onto the Natural Gas Act a finality requirement 
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that the district court regarded as “originating in state law.” Id. 
To be sure, deciding on a PADEP decision’s finality requires 
reference to the Pennsylvania procedures that produced it. But 
it remains the case that the finality requirement itself, along 
with the presumption that Congress intended us to apply it, are 
creatures of federal, not state, law. 
 We are likewise unpersuaded by Tennessee Gas’s 
analysis of the Second Circuit’s decisions in Islander East 
Pipeline Co., LLC v. Connecticut Department of 
Environmental Protection, 482 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006), and 
Islander East Pipeline Co., LLC v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141 
(2d Cir. 2008). In both Islander cases, the Second Circuit 
confronted a situation much like this one and proceeded 
without analysis, “as if there were no hurdles in appealing 
directly from the determination of a state administrative body.” 
Tennessee Gas, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 393. Implicit in that course 
of action, the district court concluded, was a “determination 
that it is not necessary for a state administrative quasi-judicial 
body to first review the . . . issuance . . . of permits by a state 
administrative agency before judicial review . . . may be 
sought.” Id. Tennessee Gas incorrectly treated the Islander 
cases, in which “jurisdiction [was] . . . assumed by the parties, 
and assumed without discussion by the court,” as authority on 
the question presented here. Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. 
Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 2016). Such “drive-by 
jurisdictional ruling[s]” would have carried no precedential 
weight even had they been decided by this Court. Id. 
B 
 We turn next to whether the Department’s decision is a 
conclusive agency action, such that a “civil action for [its] 
review” is committed to our exclusive jurisdiction under the 
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Natural Gas Act. This is not the first time we have considered 
the finality of a PADEP Water Quality Certification issued for 
a federally-regulated pipeline. In Riverkeeper II, we held that 
such an approval was final and reviewable because the time to 
appeal to the EHB had already passed. 870 F.3d at 177. Noting 
the pendency of the petitions now before us—in which most of 
the Petitioners had already taken parallel protective appeals to 
the EHB—Riverkeeper II expressly declined to consider 
whether the availability of further state administrative review 
would render the Department’s decision non-final. Id. at 178. 
We answer that question now. 
 The standard for whether agency action is final is a 
familiar one: “Final agency action ‘must mark the 
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process,’ ‘must 
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature,’ and ‘must 
be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or 
from which legal consequences will flow.’” Id. at 176 (quoting 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Berkshire Environmental, 
851 F.3d at 111.2 Although the decisionmaking process we are 
reviewing is defined by Pennsylvania law, we nevertheless 
                                                 
2 We recognize that many (if not most) decisions 
addressing administrative finality arise in the context of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 704, rather than 
agency-specific review provisions like the one we consider 
here. Nevertheless, we think that the case law evaluating 
finality under the APA is instructive, and see no reason why 
finality under the Natural Gas Act should be evaluated any 
differently. We will therefore follow Riverkeeper II’s approach 
of measuring finality in this context against “the traditional 
hallmarks of final agency action.” 870 F.3d at 178. 
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apply a federal finality standard to determine whether 
Congress has made the results of that process reviewable under 
the Natural Gas Act. 
 We begin by surveying Pennsylvania’s procedures for 
obtaining and appealing a Water Quality Certification. First, 
the applicant submits a request to PADEP. PENNSYLVANIA 
DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT. BUREAU OF WATER QUALITY 
PROTECTION, NO. 362-2000-001, PERMITTING POLICY AND 
PROCEDURE MANUAL [hereinafter PERMITTING MANUAL] 
§ 400 at 6. The Department places a notice in the Pennsylvania 
Bulletin, beginning a 30-day comment period. Id. PADEP then 
makes its decision, and “[t]he issuance or denial of [the] Water 
Quality Certification[] . . .is published in the Pennsylvania 
Bulletin as a final action of the Department.” Id. Aggrieved 
parties have 30 days from the date of publication to file an 
appeal to the EHB. 25 PA. CODE § 1021.52(a)(1), 2(i). 
 The EHB is wholly separate from PADEP. The Board 
is an “independent quasi-judicial agency,” 35 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7513(a), and its members—full-time administrative law 
judges—are appointed by the Governor of Pennsylvania 
without any involvement by either PADEP or the state’s 
Secretary of Environmental Protection, id. § 7513(b). Final 
orders of the EHB may be appealed to the Commonwealth 
Court. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 763(a)(1). 
 Two features of the Board’s review deserve special 
mention. First, an appeal to the EHB does not prevent 
PADEP’s decision from taking immediate legal effect. The 
statute creating the Board expressly provides that “[n]o appeal 
shall act as an automatic supersedeas,” 35 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7514(d)(1), and the EHB itself regards it as “axiomatic that 
the mere pendency of litigation before the Board . . . has no 
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effect on the validity or viability of the Department action 
being appealed . . . . An appeal to the Board does not operate 
as a stay,” M&M Stone Co. v. Commw. of Pa., Dept. of Envtl. 
Prot., EHB Docket No. 2007-098-L, 2009 WL 3159149, at *3 
(Pa. Envtl. Hrg. Bd. Sept. 7, 2009) (citations omitted). Second, 
the EHB’s review of PADEP decisions is conducted largely de 
novo, with parties entitled to introduce new evidence and 
otherwise alter the case they made to the Department. While 
Pennsylvania law refers to proceedings before the EHB as an 
“appeal,” the Commonwealth Court has explained that the 
Board is not an “appellate” tribunal in the ordinary sense of 
that term. The Board does not have “a limited scope of review 
attempting to determine if [PADEP]’s action can be supported 
by the evidence received . . . [by PADEP]. Rather, the 
[Board’s] duty is to determine if [PADEP]’s action can be 
sustained or supported by the evidence taken by the [Board].” 
Leatherwood, Inc. v. Commw., Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 
604, 611 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
 Once again relying heavily on Berkshire 
Environmental, Petitioners claim we may not review PADEP’s 
issuance of a Water Quality Certification until the Board 
adjudicates their appeal. After holding that its jurisdiction 
under the Natural Gas Act covered only final action, the First 
Circuit concluded that the Massachusetts Water Quality 
Certification then under its review was non-final so long as the 
petitioners could still appeal within MassDEP. Citing 
similarities between the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania 
procedures, Petitioners ask us to reach the same conclusion 
here. We disagree, primarily because there are important 
distinctions between the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania 
schemes.  
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 Two aspects of Pennsylvania’s system for issuing Water 
Quality Certifications distinguish PADEP’s decision from the 
non-final one in Berkshire Environmental. First, the 
Department’s decision here was immediately effective, 
notwithstanding Petitioners’ appeals to the EHB. The 
Department’s decision was neither “tentative [n]or 
interlocutory” and was one “from which legal 
consequences . . . flow[ed].” Riverkeeper II, 870 F.3d at 176 
(quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The First Circuit, by contrast, faced a 
Massachusetts regulatory regime in which the agency’s initial 
decision was ineffective until either the time to appeal expired 
or a final decision on appeal issued. See 310 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 9.09(1)(e); see also Berkshire Envtl., 851 F.3d at 108 
(noting that the Water Quality Certification expressly forbade 
any work under its auspices until “the expiration of the Appeal 
Period . . . and any appeal proceedings”). Put another way, 
Berkshire Environmental addressed a provisional order that 
could become final in the absence of an appeal, while we are 
presented with a final order that could be overturned in the 
event of an appeal. In that regard, PADEP’s order is no less 
final for the availability of EHB review than a federal agency’s 
is for the availability of review in this Court. 
 Second, unlike in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania law 
does not “make[] clear that [Transco]’s application seeking 
a . . . water quality certification initiated a single, unitary 
proceeding” taking place within one agency and yielding one 
final decision. Berkshire Envtl., 851 F.3d at 112. Quite the 
opposite. The Department and the Board are entirely 
independent agencies. Each conducts a separate proceeding, 
under separate rules, overseen by separately appointed officers. 
Compare 25 PA. CODE. Part I (Department of Environmental 
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Protection), with 25 PA. CODE. Part IX (Environmental 
Hearing Board). Both in formal terms, see PERMITTING 
MANUAL, supra, § 400 at 6 (noting that publication in the 
Pennsylvania Bulletin marks a “final action of the 
Department”), and in the immediate practical effect discussed 
above, PADEP’s issuance of a Water Quality Certification is 
that agency’s final action, leaving nothing for the Department 
to do other than await the conclusion of any proceedings before 
the Board.3 
 Whether state law permits further review by the same 
agency that makes the initial decision or provides for an appeal 
to a structurally-separate body is probative of whether that 
decision is final. Finality, at bottom, is “concerned with 
whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive 
                                                 
3 Petitioners emphasize another parallel between EHB 
review in Pennsylvania and an adjudicatory hearing in 
Massachusetts: both conduct de novo review without deference 
to the appealed decision. And to be sure, the First Circuit relied 
in part on the fact that “the adjudicatory hearing [was] a review 
of [the pipeline company]’s application, rather than a review 
of a prior agency decision.” Berkshire Envtl., 851 F.3d at 112. 
But the court in Berkshire Environmental did not rely on the 
fact of de novo review for its own sake in finding the agency’s 
initial decision non-final. Rather, it concluded that the decision 
was non-final because several features of Massachusetts’s 
administrative scheme—de novo review among them—
combined to produce a “review” process that “continue[d] 
more or less as though no decision ha[d] been rendered at all.” 
See id. The same cannot be said of review by the EHB in 
Pennsylvania, which takes place after a decision that has 
immediate legal effect. 
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position on the issue,” and PADEP has said its piece regardless 
of whether Pennsylvania law gives a different agency the last 
word. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985) (emphasis 
added). In that respect, finality is “conceptually distinct” from 
the related issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. 
at 192–93. Here, Petitioners confine themselves to challenging 
the finality of PADEP’s decision, and do not argue that we lack 
jurisdiction because of a failure to exhaust an appeal to the 
EHB. 
 Petitioners do not rest exclusively on the comparison 
between this case and Berkshire Environmental. Nevertheless, 
we find their other arguments no more persuasive. 
 Petitioners are incorrect that the Department’s decision 
is non-final for purposes of this Court’s review because a 
Pennsylvania statute provides that “no action of [PADEP] shall 
be final as to [a] person until the person has had the opportunity 
to appeal the action to the [EHB]” or the time to appeal has 
expired. 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7514(c). Despite this language, 
Pennsylvania cannot declare when and how an agency action 
taken pursuant to federal law is sufficiently final to be reviewed 
in federal court. State law’s use of the word “final” to 
characterize an agency’s decision is irrelevant in that context, 
except so far as that language is relevant to the substantive 
effect of the order in question and the practical character of the 
procedures surrounding it. Here, those underlying realities 
indicate that PADEP has taken final action. 
 Nor does due process require that Petitioners have an 
opportunity to present evidence at a hearing before the EHB. 
“There are instances in which due process requires that an 
agency afford an adversarial mode of procedure and an 
 18 
 
evidentiary hearing,” but this “is not such an instance.” See 
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. ARA Servs., Inc., 717 F.2d 57, 67 
(3d Cir. 1983). The essence of due process is notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, and with respect to decisions like the 
one under review here, the public comment period provided 
Petitioners “with meaningful hearing rights sufficient under the 
circumstances to protect [their] interests.” See Bank of N. Shore 
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 743 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 
1984). Due process does not entitle Petitioners to a de novo 
evidentiary hearing; the opportunity to comment and to 
petition this Court for review is enough. 
 Notwithstanding the availability of an appeal to the 
EHB, PADEP’s issuance of a Water Quality Certification was 
final in precisely the most important ways that the permit in 
Berkshire Environmental was not. The Department’s action 
presents all the “traditional hallmarks of final agency action,” 
Riverkeeper II, 870 F.3d at 178, and we have exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear any “civil action for the review” of such a 
decision. We now turn to Petitioners’ challenges to the merits 
of the Department’s decision. 
III 
 Petitioners make four separate arguments on the 
substance of their claims.4 First, they claim PADEP failed to 
provide the public notice the Clean Water Act requires prior to 
issuing a Water Quality Certification. Second, they contend the 
Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously by issuing a 
Water Quality Certification that was immediately effective 
despite being conditioned on Transco obtaining additional 
                                                 
4 Not every petitioner joins in every argument. For the 
sake of simplicity we refer generically to “Petitioners.” 
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permits in the future. Third, pointing out that PADEP’s 
approval was necessary for Transco to begin eminent domain 
proceedings under the Natural Gas Act, Petitioners argue that 
the Department’s decision deprived them of due process and 
violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Finally, 
Petitioners assert that the Department’s action violated its 
obligation to safeguard the Commonwealth’s natural resources 
under Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 
We address these arguments seriatim. 
A 
 The Clean Water Act obliges state agencies to comply 
with a number of procedural requirements before issuing a 
Water Quality Certification. As relevant here, Section 401 
requires PADEP to “establish procedures for public notice in 
the case of all applications for certification.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a)(1). No party disputes that the Department has a 
longstanding written policy, published in its Permitting 
Manual, that when it “receives a request for Water Quality 
Certification, a notice is published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin 
for a 30-day comment period.” PERMITTING MANUAL, supra, 
§ 400 at 6. And no party disputes that the Department followed 
that policy here. Nevertheless, Petitioners claim it was 
insufficient to satisfy Section 401. We disagree. 
 First, Petitioners cite several cases in which “[c]ourts 
have found that Section 401(a)(1)’s notice requirements are 
met where the state codifies the notice requirements by statute 
or regulation.” Riverkeeper Br. 25–26. But none of those 
decisions—and nothing in the text of the Clean Water Act—
requires a State to establish its notice procedures by way of 
regulation. The fact that formal rulemaking is sufficient to 
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satisfy the requirement of established notice procedures does 
not mean it is necessary. 
 Second, Petitioners claim this Court has already “held” 
that PADEP has “failed to ‘establish’ procedures for public 
notice” under Section 401. Riverkeeper Br. 26–27. Petitioners’ 
only support for that claim is a single clause in our decision in 
Riverkeeper I: “PADEP has not published any procedures for 
issuing Water Quality Certifications.” 833 F.3d at 385. 
Reading that clause in context, however, makes clear that it 
does not refer to PADEP’s procedures for providing public 
notice of Section 401 applications. Indeed, PADEP’s notice 
procedures were not at issue in that case. Rather, we considered 
PADEP’s procedures for processing such applications—what 
information the agency would gather and evaluate before 
issuing a Water Quality Certification. Id. at 385–86. Contrary 
to Petitioners’ suggestion, we have never held anything with 
respect to PADEP’s notice procedures. 
 Third, Petitioners suggest that “PADEP itself has 
implicitly conceded” its failure to establish adequate notice 
procedures by publishing a draft of new procedures for 
considering Section 401 Certifications, including notice 
procedures. Riverkeeper Br. 27–28. We are unpersuaded. The 
Department has not conceded that its existing notice 
procedures are legally inadequate by moving to promulgate a 
single set of rules governing the entire Water Quality 
Certification process. 
 Finally, Petitioners contend that Section 401 required 
PADEP to immediately give full notice not only of Transco’s 
application for a Water Quality Certification, but also of the 
three substantive permits on which the Department proposed 
to condition its approval. That argument also fails. Notice need 
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only be adequate to allow interested parties to participate 
meaningfully in the process that is actually pending, and 
PADEP’s process for granting Water Quality Certifications 
does not involve immediate consideration of any substantive 
permits. This Court approved that arrangement just two years 
ago, holding that when the Department conditions a 
Certification on the later acquisition of other permits, the 
agency may issue the Certification without engaging in the 
substantive review that will eventually be required to grant the 
permits. Riverkeeper I, 833 F.3d at 387–88. Since PADEP is 
not required to conduct that review at this stage, it would make 
little sense to require it to provide notice of the same. 
B 
 Petitioners also assert that the Department’s decision to 
issue a Water Quality Certification now, conditioned on 
Transco obtaining substantive permits later, was arbitrary, 
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Petitioners 
make two versions of that argument. First, they claim 
PADEP’s decision was arbitrary because it certified Atlantic 
Sunrise’s water quality compliance based on a pledge that 
Transco would demonstrate substantive compliance in a future 
permit application rather than in the application for the Water 
Quality Certification itself. Without that present demonstration 
of compliance, Petitioners argue, PADEP’s decision that 
Atlantic Sunrise would comply with Pennsylvania water 
quality standards could not have been based on anything but 
guesswork. Second, Petitioners say the Department failed to 
follow its own procedures, which they claim require the agency 
to consider applications for Water Quality Certifications 
simultaneously with any applicable substantive permits. 
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 Both of those arguments—which at bottom focus on the 
timing rather than the substance of the Department’s 
decision—are foreclosed by our decision in Riverkeeper I. In 
that case, we held that PADEP’s preferred procedure for 
considering Certifications along with other permits was not 
arbitrary or capricious because—since no construction can 
begin before the Department grants the substantive permits, 
and all interested parties will have a full opportunity to weigh 
in when PADEP considers applications for those permits—the 
petitioners could not show they had been harmed by the 
Department’s sequencing choice. Riverkeeper I, 833 F.3d at 
386–87. The same analysis applies with equal force here. 
Petitioners attempt to distinguish this case by arguing that they 
have been harmed by the Department’s choice not to provide 
notice of the substantive permits upon which it conditioned the 
Water Quality Certification. But as we discussed herein, 
Petitioners will suffer no harm from PADEP’s decision to 
provide notice of those permits at the time it actually considers 
them.  
C 
 Petitioners next argue that PADEP’s issuance of a 
conditional Water Quality Certification violates the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Natural Gas Act, any 
natural gas company holding a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity may acquire a pipeline right-of-
way through eminent domain. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). The 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity establishes 
the legal right to take property; in a condemnation proceeding 
under the Natural Gas Act, the “only open issue [is] the 
compensation the landowner defendant will receive in return 
for the easement.” Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 
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Acres, More or Less in Penn Twp., York Cty., Pa., Located on 
Tax ID #440002800150000000 Owned By Brown, 768 F.3d 
300, 304 (3d Cir. 2014). Petitioners assert that PADEP violated 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when it issued a 
conditional Water Quality Certification—a condition 
precedent for initiating eminent domain proceedings under 
Transco’s Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity—
based on a relatively restricted administrative process. 
 Regardless of its underlying merits, and setting aside 
questions about whether the Clean Water Act could ever 
provide a vehicle to raise a takings argument, see Gunpowder 
Riverkeeper v. FERC, 807 F.3d 267, 274–75 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(concluding that “an injury arising specifically by reason of 
eminent domain” falls outside the zone of interests protected 
by the statute), that claim cannot succeed because Petitioners 
have presented it in the wrong forum. Their argument does not 
challenge PADEP’s judgment that Transco will comply with 
Pennsylvania’s water-quality standards. Nor does it ask this 
Court to review the Department’s reasoning, its procedures, or 
the facts on which it based its decision. Rather, Petitioners’ 
eminent-domain argument is in substance a challenge to 
FERC’s order granting a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity. And that order may only be challenged by a request 
for rehearing before FERC itself, or by a petition for review by 
an appropriate federal circuit court. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a)–
(b); Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. City of Okla. City, 890 F.2d 255, 
264 (10th Cir. 1989). Petitioners respond, in essence, that those 
avenues are inadequate because if Petitioners took advantage 
of them, Transco would resist and Petitioners might lose. That 
argument refutes itself. 
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D 
 Petitioners’ final argument—that PADEP failed to 
comply with its obligations under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution—also fails. Article I, Section 27 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution establishes a common right to the 
Commonwealth’s natural resources and obligates its 
government to hold those resources in trust. Petitioners argue 
that PADEP failed to live up to that obligation when it issued 
a Water Quality Certification conditioned on Transco later 
obtaining certain substantive permits.  
 Transco responds that a state constitutional claim is not 
cognizable in this proceeding, arguing that by vesting 
jurisdiction in this Court to review PADEP’s Certification 
decision, the Natural Gas Act provides for only a narrow scope 
of review that does not permit us to hear state-law claims. 
Transco points to § 717r(d)(3) of the Act, which states that if 
the reviewing court of appeals finds that an agency’s action 
was “inconsistent with the Federal law governing such permit 
and would prevent the construction, expansion or operation of 
the facility . . . , the Court shall remand the proceeding to the 
agency.” 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(3) (emphasis added). In 
Transco’s view, the statute’s requirement that we remand to the 
agency when certain conditions are met implies that remand is 
the only remedy available to us, and then only under the 
conditions just quoted. Therefore, Transco asserts, we may not 
reach the merits of Petitioners’ claim under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. We cannot agree.  
The provision of the Natural Gas Act that actually 
grants us jurisdiction, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1), is quite 
capacious. It empowers us to hear “any civil action” seeking 
“review” of federal permits required by interstate pipelines. 
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And ordinarily, when such agency action is “made reviewable 
by statute,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, the Administrative Procedure Act 
authorizes a broad scope of review, without limiting courts to 
considering only federal law, see id. § 706. Nothing in 
§ 717r(d)(3) says differently; it simply requires reviewing 
courts to apply a particular remedy when certain conditions are 
met. It says nothing about other circumstances, and we will not 
imply from the statute’s silence that Congress intended to 
restrict the language of its text. Congress does not “hide 
elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns. 
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).5 
 Nevertheless, Petitioners’ claim under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution cannot succeed on the merits. Petitioners 
essentially complain that PADEP could not have met its 
obligation to safeguard Pennsylvania’s natural resources 
because it granted a Water Quality Certification before 
collecting the environmental impact data that would be 
required to issue the substantive permits on which it was 
conditioned. That fails for the same reason that we rejected 
Petitioners’ argument that PADEP’s decision to grant a Water 
Quality Certification conditioned on obtaining other permits 
was arbitrary and capricious. See supra III.B. Because Transco 
will have to obtain those substantive permits to begin 
construction—and PADEP will have to consider Article I, 
                                                 
5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has recently reached the same conclusion. Sierra Club 
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, — F.3d —, 2018 WL 3717067, at 
*25 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018) (holding that when an agency’s 
action would not “prevent the construction” of a pipeline, 
§ 717r(d)(3) did not apply and “the APA’s default rule” 
governed) 
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Section 27 in deciding whether to grant or deny them—
Petitioners cannot show that they have been harmed by the 
Department’s decision to issue a conditional Water Quality 
Certification. 
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will deny the petitions for 
review. 
